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DATA COLLECTION AND LEAKAGE
PHILIP HOWARD AND KRIS ERICKSON*
INTRODUCTION
Two questions have directed my research in the last few years. First, I
have been exploring the role of consumer personally identifiable informa-
tion in campaigns-where do political campaign managers get their data
and how is it used? Second, in joint work with Kris Erikson, we have em-
pirically assessed the extent of data breaches reported in the media during
1995-2005. Both of these questions involve issues of information securi-
ty-how consumers can or cannot control access and use of their informa-
tion.
I. THE MARKET FOR POLITICAL CONSUMER DATA
Discussion usually centers on the political implications of keeping
private consumer data private. However, what has not been discussed
equally is a much more explicitly political market in very political consum-
er data. I believe that there is a difference between what people say and
what people do, and sometimes it is important to track both, and to consider
both, of these patterns. We understand what people mean when they talk
about privacy and what political campaign managers mean when they think
they are talking about privacy. However, not all of these political campaign
managers have exactly the same opinion. They have a diversity of opinion.
A number of professionals specialize in building various political or-
ganizations, such as websites for the NRA, the Push Coalition, 2 and the
NAACP. 3 Although one may assume that these groups would never have
much to do with each other, they actually rely on the same small communi-
* Philip N. Howard is an associate professor in the Department of Communication at the Uni-
versity of Washington. He directs the National Science Foundation-funded World Information Access
Project (www.wiaproject.org) and the Project on Information Technology and Political Islam
(www.pitpi.org). His book, The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technol-
ogy and Political Islam, was recently published by Oxford University Press.
1. National Rifle Association, http://www.nra.org (last visited Dec. 4, 2009).
2. Rainbow Push Coalition, http://www.rainbowpush.org (last visited Dec. 4, 2009).
3. NAACP, http://www.naacp.org (last visited Dec. 4, 2009).
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ties of computer professionals for their data management. The quality of
research is really interesting when you want to learn about the norms of a
small community.
In traditional politics, individual policy preferences could only be
meaningfully categorized by a small number of demographic variables.
Those are the simple variables that political campaign managers use. But,
now I can differentiate many gradations of variables and political culture.
So, there is a community of people who increasingly rely on political
information technologies for attempting to reach voters. In 1960, it was a
little over a dollar that presidential campaigns spent to get each person to
actually show up on Election Day.4 It is up to six dollars for the 2004 cam-
paign.5 Most of that goes toward television and other media. But, increa-
singly, campaigns' money allocations go to finding data on constituents to
allow them to target voters more effectively.6
Politically minded individuals will probably have heard the terms
"soft votes" and "hard votes." "Hard votes" describe a situation where a
congressional leader promises his or her constituents something specific. 7
That is a hard vote to move. A "soft vote" is someone who has not ex-
pressed political opinions; that is, the voter is flexible in terms of commit-
ting to vote a certain way.8 There are three consistent patterns to the
decision making process for campaign managers who go after soft votes in
particular. They decide to mine for data.9 The goal of mining for data is not
to figure out who is important in your district. It is actually about figuring
who not to spend any time with. The major source of waste in a political
campaign is to try to communicate with people you know are not going to
vote for you. For example, African-Americans may get significantly less
attention from political campaigns, because the assumption is that cam-
paign managers do not need to spend much time trying to communicate
with people who historically are statistically less likely to vote.10
A second set of technology issues that relate to political institutions
are mistakes. Technology service providers make little red and blue maps
4. PHILIP N. HOWARD, NEW MEDIA CAMPAIGNS AND THE MANAGED CITIZEN 146 (2006).
5. Id. at 146.
6. Id. at 147.
7. For a discussion of hard votes, see, for example, Phuong Cat Le, Powerful Voices Against
Expanded Gambling, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 1, 2003, at B 1.
8. HOWARD, supra note 4, at 90.
9. For a discussion of data mining, see, for example, id. at 76-77.
10. See Mark Hugo Lopez, Emily Kirby & Jared Sagoff, The Youth Vote 2004, CIRCLE (2005),
http://www.civicyouth.org/PopUps/FactSheets/FSYouthVoting-72-04.pdf (discussing lower African
American voter turnout).
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of which states are going which way, and those maps are also used by the
newsrooms. It is interesting to see that mistakes of these maps were even-
tually being loaded to the newsrooms and then loaded for distribution on-
line. Counting and reporting mistakes can happen face-to-face in an
election, but there are also transition mistakes by the polling stations trying
to get data to election offices. Companies like Voter Data Services that are
there to try to collect the sense of the public opinion on election day do it
largely to generate news coverage, but they are also supposed to be a dem-
ocratic double check on the elections process polling. Exit polling is very
important and it is a process that is not free of mistakes. "1
Finally, there are interpreted mistakes, and these are the kind of mis-
takes that we see watching the news, like television journalists giving data
to viewers when they decide to call something. They wait before they call
an election: What they are waiting for is for their producers to actually
double check these other kinds of mistakes, and when they feel confident
they accept the risk of being wrong. They go ahead and make their inter-
pretation.
II. DATA BREACHES 1995-2005
Looking at a different category of Internet mistakes, in joint work with
Kris Erikson, we conducted research on data breaches, performing a search
of incidents of electronic data12 loss reported in major U.S. news media
from 1980-2006.13 We also consulted lists of electronic data breaches
compiled by third-party computer security advisories, such as the Identity
Theft Resource Center (www.idtheftcenter.org) and Attrition.org. Our me-
thod yielded 589 incidents, 550 of which were successfully cross-checked
with LexisNexis and Proquest to ensure accuracy and thirty-nine of which
we discarded for involving citizens of other countries or for being unverifi-
11. HOWARD, supra note 4, at 16.
12. We defined electronic personal records as data containing privileged information about an
individual that cannot be readily obtained through other public means. We define "personal data" to be
information that should reasonably be known only to the individual concerned or be held by an organi-
zation under the terms of a confidentiality agreement. Electronic personal records therefore could
include individuals' personal credit histories, banking information such as credit card numbers or
account numbers, medical records, social security numbers, and grades earned at school.
13. These included print publications with national circulation such as the New York Times, the
L.A. Times, and USA Today, along with major broadcast news media. Because some news reports
contained references to more than one incident, we employed a snowball methodology to expand our
analysis by including additional security breaches mentioned in the same article. Duplicate entries were
eliminated by comparing news stories on the basis of organizations involved, dates, and other incident




able in major news media reports. 14 We are not venturing into the broader
debate about the virtues and dangers of online anonymity; 15 we have cho-
sen to focus only on data that are more sensitive than the information that
we regularly volunteer in the course of surfing the web. We also focused
only on incidents where compromised personal records were kept for a
legitimate purpose by a company, institution, or government agency. 16 All
of the incidents in our analysis deal with data that were maintained in elec-
tronic form, although in some cases compromised data were contained on a
lost or stolen laptop computer.
III. THE SCALE OF LOST DATA
Between 1980 and 2006, some 1.9 billion records were reported com-
promised by government agencies, firms, hospitals, universities, and the
military. This is the sum of compromised records from 529 cases in which
some estimate of the volume of lost records was offered, though in 60 of
these incidents the impact of the security breach was unknown. In a sense,
this number of lost records is larger than we might expect because a few
landmark incidents account for large portions of the total number of records
compromised. On the other hand, the number of confirmed incidents-550
in all-may seem smaller than expected given the twenty-six year time
frame of our search. Some articles report multiple incidents, and, of course,
14. Our list of reported incidents is limited to cases where one or more electronic personal records
were compromised through mishandling or theft. There are interesting advantages and disadvantages to
using printed news sources to construct the history of computer hacking and breached private records.
As stated above, the mainstream media often equate hackers with any crime involving a computer and
use the misnomer "hacker" without a nuanced understanding of the history of more legitimate computer
hacking. We use the term in this analysis because it is the most commonly used term in media reports
where an intruder was deemed responsible for compromised data. While criminal records would cer-
tainly provide details about the prevalence of malicious intrusions, such records are extremely difficult
to collect nationwide. Moreover, a survey of incidents composed through criminal records would
significantly over-sample incidents where an individual hacker was at fault, and significantly under-
sample incidents where an organization was culpable but not deemed criminally negligent. Over the
decade, journalists would not have discovered all incidents. However, journalists do their best to report
the facts, and in the absence of a public agency that might maintain comprehensive incident records on
privacy violations, news accounts provide a good accessible resource.
15. For a discussion of anonymity online, see, for example, Konrad S. Lee, Hiding from the Boss
Online: The Anti-Employer Blogger's Legal Quest for Anonymity, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 135 (2006); Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online Anonym-
ity and the First Amendment, 8 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 405 (2003).
16. Consequently, "phishing," or spoofing scams where victims are deceived into volunteering
their own personal information, are not included in our analysis. For a discussion of phishing, see, for
exmaple, Rasha AlMahroos, Phishing for the Answer: Recent Developments in Combating Phishing, 3
ISJLP 595 (2008); Camille Calman, Bigger Phish to Fry: California's Anti-Phishing Statute and its
Potential Imposition of Secondary Liability on Internet Service Providers, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1
(2006).
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many incidents were covered by journalists on multiple occasions.
In 2004, the Census Bureau estimated that there were 217 million
adults living in the United States. 17 We can conservatively estimate that for
every U.S. adult, in the aggregate, at least nine private records have been
compromised. Unfortunately, we cannot know how many of these com-
promised private records have actually been used for identity theft, or how
many were sold to marketing companies. Identity theft can have a signifi-
cant impact on an individual whose identity is stolen and can taint the repu-
tation of the organization that was compromised. But in the incidents
studied here, the security breach is often with commercial firms and, in-
creasingly, educational institutions, rather than individuals.
A single incident, involving 1.6 billion compromised records at Ac-
xiom, accounts for a large portion of the volume of records lost in the pe-
riod from 2000-2006.18 If this event is removed from this period, then
thirty-two percent of the compromised volume and thirty percent of the
incidents are related to hackers, forty-eight percent of the compromised
volume and sixty-two percent of the incidents involve organizational beha-
vior, and twenty percent of the compromised volume and eight percent of
the incidents remain unattributed. If this event is removed from the volume
of compromised records for the whole study period-between 1980 and
2006-then forty-five percent of the total volume of compromised records
related to hackers, twenty-seven percent of the volume was attributed to the
organization, and twenty-eight percent remained unattributed. If this event
is removed from the total number of incidents for the whole study period,
then thirty-one percent of the incidents involved hackers, sixty percent
involved organizational management, and nine percent remain unattributed.
Regardless of how the data is broken down, hackers never account for even
half of the incidents or the volume of compromised records.
The majority of incidents involved commercial actors, less than a third
of the incidents involved colleges and universities, and the remainder in-
volved government, hospitals, and the military. When the exceptional loss
17. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1: ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION FOR THE UNITED
STATES AND STATES, AND FOR PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2004 (2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2004-01 .pdf.
18. For a discussion of the Acxiom data breach, see, for example, Caryn Rousseau, Hacker Ac-
cesses Customer Information from Database Manager Acxiom, SECURITYFOCUS, Aug. 7, 2003,
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/6665; Jay Lyman, Acxiom Database Hack Highlights Risk,
TECHNEWSWORLD, Aug. 11, 2003, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/31306.htm; Laura Rohde,




of 1.6 billion personal records by Acxiom Corporation is removed, 19 the
commercial sector still accounted for approximately 252 million individual
compromised records, four times that of the next highest contributor, the
government sector.20 The education sector accounted for a small percen-
tage of the overall quantity of lost records but accounted for thirty percent
of all reported incidents, suggesting that educational institutions suffer
from a higher rate of computer insecurity than might be anticipated. This
could be explained by the fact that colleges and universities generally
maintain large electronic databases on current and past students, staff, fa-
culty, and alumni, and have an organizational culture geared towards in-
formation sharing. However, medical institutions-which presumably also
maintain large quantities of electronic data-reported a significantly lower
number of incidents of data loss.
In the early reports, most incidents were described as an unspecified
breach or as the general result of hacker activity. However, for the period
between 2000 and 2006, thirty-one percent of the incidents were about a
breach caused by a hacker, eight percent of the incidents involve an unspe-
cified breach, and sixty-one percent of the incidents involved different
kinds of organizational culpability. For example, sometimes management
accidentally exposed private records online, administrative error resulted in
leaked data, or employees were caught using the data for activities not re-
lated to the work of the organization. On some occasions, staff simply mis-
placed backup tapes, while on others, computer equipment such as laptops
were stolen.21
IV. CURRENT REGULATORY APPROACHES
Legislators at the federal and state levels have adopted two main strat-
egies to address the problem of electronic record management. On one
hand, they have directly targeted those individuals, computer hackers,
whose actions potentially threaten the security of private electronic data
through the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).22 The second strate-
19. See sources cited supra note 18.
20. For a more complete exposition of the findings, see Kris Erickson & Philip N. Howard, A
Case of Mistaken Identity? News Accounts of Hacker, Consumer, and Organizational Responsibility for
Compromised Digital Records, 12 J. OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 1229, 1237 (2007).
21. Id. at 1239.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). For a discussion of the CFAA and criminal computer intrusion
generally, see, for example, Susan W. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed
Security, 10 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 1 (2004); Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime 's Scope: Interpreting "Access "
and "Authorization" in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1596 (2003); see also Neal
Kumar Katyal, Digital Architecture as Crime Control, 112 YALE L.J. 2261 (2003).
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gy employed by regulators might be thought of as an indirect, or discipli-
nary, strategy through data breach notification legislation, which obliges




The CFAA has been repeatedly strengthened in response to a percep-
tion that electronic data theft represents a material and growing concern.
24
The fact that punishments for computer intrusion now surpass those for
many other more violent forms of crime suggests that federal legislators
consider computer crime to constitute a serious threat to our personal and
collective security. However, our data suggest that malicious intrusion by
hackers makes up only a portion of all reported cases, while other factors,
including poor management practices by organizations themselves, contri-
bute more to the problem.
Surveying news reports of incidents of compromised personal records
helps us to understand the diverse situations in which electronic personal
records are stolen, lost, or mismanaged. More important, it allows us to
separate incidents in which personal records have been compromised by
outside hackers from incidents in which breaches were the result of an or-
ganizational lapse. Of course, we should expect organizations to perform
due diligence and safeguard the digital records holding personal informa-
tion from attack by malicious intruders. But often organizations are both
the unwilling and unwitting victims of a malicious hacker. Through this
study of reported incidents of compromised data, we found that two-fifths
of the incidents over the last quarter century involve malicious hackers with
criminal intent.
Surprisingly, however, the proportion of reported incidents involving
hackers is smaller than the proportion of incidents involving organizational
action or inaction. While thirty-one percent of the incidents reported clearly
identify a hacker as the culprit, sixty percent of the incidents involve miss-
ing or stolen hardware, insider abuse or theft, administrative error, or acci-
dentally exposing data online. The remainder of news stories record too
little information about the breach to determine the cause--either organiza-
tions or individual hackers might be to blame for some of these incidents.
23. For a discussion of state data breach notification statutes see, for example, Paul M. Schwartz
& Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REv. 913 (2007).
24. For a discussion of CFAA evolution see, for example, Linda K. Stevens & Jesi J. Carlson, The
CFAA: New Remedies For Employee Computer Abuse, 96 ILL. B.J. 144 (2008).
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Organizations can probably be blamed for the management practices that
result in administrative errors, lost backup tapes, or data exposed online.
And even though an organization can be the victim of theft by its em-
ployees, we might still expect organizations to develop suitable safeguards
to ensure the safety of client, customer, or member data. Even using the
news media's expansive definition of hacker as a basis for coding stories,
we find that a large portion of the security breaches in the United States are
due to various forms of organizational malfeasance. One important out-
come of the legislation is improved information about the types of security
breaches. Many of the news stories between 1980 and 2004 report paltry
details, with sources being off the record and vague estimates of the severi-
ty of the security breach. Since mandatory reporting legislation has been
enacted in many states, 25 most news coverage provides more substantive
details. In 2006, only ten of the 257 news stories were unable to make some
attribution of responsibility for a security breach.
B. Data Breach Notification Legislation
While this directly addresses the problem of consumer protection by
empowering individuals to protect themselves in case of lost or stolen data,
it has probably been intended to produce secondary effects. Companies and
institutions, wary of both the negative publicity and the financial costs gen-
erated by an incident of data loss, are encouraged to adopt more responsible
network administration practices. Similarly, end-users are urged to weigh
both the risk of doing business electronically and the costs associated with
taking action once they are notified of a potential breach.
The differences we saw across data categories may be the result of
strong privacy legislation in the arena of medical information,26 compared
to weak privacy legislation in the arena of educational and commercial
information. The bulk of the reports occur in 2005 and 2006, after data
breach legislation in California,27 Washington, 28 and other states29 took
effect. There were three times as many incidents in the period between
25. For a list of state data breach notification statutes, see National Conference of State Legisla-
tures, State Security Breach Notification Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breachlaws.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
26. For a discussion of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, see, for example,
Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Securing The HIPAA Security Rule, J. INTERNET L., Feb. 2007, at
I.
27. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56.06, 1785.11.2, 1798.29, 1798.82 (West 2008 and Supp. 2009).
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.010 (West 2008).
29. See supra note 25.
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2005 and 2006 as there were in the previous twenty-five years.
Interestingly, the mandatory reporting legislation seems to have ex-
posed educational institutions as a major source of leakage of private data.
In total, thirty-eight percent of the incidents involved commercial firms, but
specifically in 2005 and 2006, thirty-five percent of the incidents involved
educational institutions. These kinds of organizations may have been the
least equipped to protect the data of their students, staff, faculty, and alum-
ni. For the majority of incidents, the news article reports some information
about how the records were compromised. A closer reading of each of the
incidents, however, reveals that most incidents involve different combina-
tions of mismanagement, criminal intent, and, occasionally, bad luck. The
hacker label is often used, even when the theft is perpetrated by an insider,
such as a student or employee. Moreover, company public relations experts
often posit that personal records were only exposed, not compromised,
when employees post private records to a website or lose a laptop, and the
company cannot be sure that anyone has taken specific advantage of the
security breach.
First, it is noticeable that as more states require organizations to report
compromised digital records, the overall volume of annual news stories on
the topic has increased significantly. In fact, there were more reported inci-
dents in 2005 and 2006 than in the previous twenty-five years combined.
We found 126 incidents of compromised records between 1980 and 2004,
and 424 incidents between 2005 and 2006. Just summing the incidents
from 2005 and 2006, when mandatory reporting legislation was in place in
many states, we find that sixty-eight percent of the stories concern data that
were accidentally placed online or exposed through administrative errors,
stolen equipment, or other security breaches such as employee loss of
equipment or backup tapes. 30
30. Several factors might explain the pattern of increasing incidents and volume of compromised
data over time. First, there is the possibility that the results are skewed due to the relative growth of
new, fresh news stories devoted to this issue, and the loss of older stories that disappeared from news
archives as time passed. Perhaps there have always been hundreds of incidents every year, but only in
recent years has the severity of the problem been reported in the news. If this were the case, we would
expect to see a gradually decaying pattern with greater number of reported cases in 2006 than in 2005,
2004, and so on. However, the dramatic difference in reported incidents between later years and early
years suggests that this effect does not adequately explain our observations. A second possibility is that
increased media attention or sensational reporting in 2005 and 2006 lead to a relative over-reporting of
incidents, compared with previous years. While it is unlikely that media outlets have exaggerated the
amount of electronic personal record loss, it is possible that in previous years a certain number of events
went unreported in the media due to lack of awareness or interest in the issue of identity theft. A third
possibility is that there were a greater number of reported incidents of data loss in 2005 and 2006,
because institutions are maintaining and losing a larger quantity of electronic data, and because a
changing legislative environment in many states is obliging institutions to report events publicly that
2010]
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The Notification of Breach legislation that requires the prompt report-
ing of lost records in California came into effect in 2003; however, the
legislation was not widely adopted and implemented by other states until
2005, which might help to explain the dramatic increase in reported cases.
The Notification of Breach legislation in California, as many other states,
requires notification when a state resident has been a victim of data loss,
regardless of where the offending institution resides. Therefore, institutions
located in states without Notification of Breach laws are still required to
report cases to victims who live in states that have enacted this type of leg-
islation, such as New York. The nature and complexity of many databases
means that in many cases, compromised databases are likely to contain
information about residents who are protected by notification of breach
legislation, thus increasing the total number of reported cases.
V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Although computer hacking has been widely reframed as a criminal
activity and has received increasingly harsh punishments, the legal re-
sponse has obfuscated the responsibility of commercial, educational, gov-
ernment, medical, and military organizations for data security. The scale
and scope of electronic record loss over the past decade would suggest that
organizational self-regulation or self-monitoring is failing to keep our per-
sonal records secure and that the state has a more direct role to play in pro-
tecting personal information.
State-level initiatives have helped expose the problem by making it
possible to collect better data on the types of security breaches that are
occurring and to make some judgments about who is responsible for the
breaches. If public policy can be used to create incentives for organizations
to better manage personally identifiable information and punish organiza-
tions for mismanagement, such initiative would probably have to come at
the state level. Electronically stored data might very well be weightless, but
the organizations that retain personally identifiable information must
shoulder more of the heavy burden for keeping such data secure.
This practice of using a risk/reward calculus to achieve policy objec-
tives through legislation has been termed governing "in the shadow of the
may have gone unreported in previous years. The fourth possibility, and the most plausible one, is that
mandatory reporting legislation has exposed both the severity of the problem and the common circums-
tances of organizational mismanagement. It is likely that a combination of factors explain our observa-
tions.
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law" by some authors working in the critical legal studies 31 and govern-
mentality literature.32 One potential problem with this strategy is that the
risks and rewards will be unequally distributed among various individual,
state, and corporate actors. While a large corporation might possess the
resources and technical skill necessary to encrypt data, secure networks, or
hire external auditors, other institutions in the private or public sector may
not find the risk of potential record loss worth the expenditure necessary to
secure that data. Governing through this type of market discipline is likely
to result in a wide spectrum of responses from differentially situated actors.
There are a number of alternatives open to lawmakers and policy advi-
sors that could materially strengthen the security of electronic personal
records in this country. Alternatives include setting stricter standards for
information management, levying fines against institutions that violate
information security standards, and mandating the encryption of all compu-
terized personal data. However, the introduction of legislation to directly
regulate institutions that handle electronic information would certainly be
controversial. A wide variety of agencies, companies, and organizations
manage personal records on a daily basis. This complexity would hinder
the imposition of standardized practices such as encryption protocols. Cor-
porations would probably balk at the prospect of having to pay fines or
introduce expensive security measures, and accuse the government of
heavy-handed interference. Others might argue that the imperatives of free-
market capitalism demand that the government refrain from adopting puni-
tive legislation, especially in order to maximize competitiveness.
31. For a discussion of critical legal studies, see generally Adam Gearey, Anxiety and Affirmation:
Critical Legal Studies and the Critical "Tradition(s), " 31 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585 (2007);
E. Dana Neacsu, CLS Stands for Critical Legal Studies, If Anyone Remembers, 8 J.L. & POL'Y 415
(2000); John Henry Schlegel, Alan and I: Of Community, Critical Legal Studies and All That, 44 BUFF.
L. REv. 636 (1996); Gregory G. Schultz, Statutory Deconstruction: An Examination of Critical Legal
Studies in Context, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 459 (1995); Jason E. Whitehead, From Criticism to Critique:
Preserving the Radical Potential of Critical Legal Studies Through a Reexamination of Frankfurt
School Critical Theory, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 701 (1999).
32. For a discussion of governmentality, see Jonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automo-
bile Accidents, Insurance, and the Challenge to Social Order in the Inter-War Years, 1919-1941, 4
CONN. INS. L.J. 521 (1997).
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